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Commodity  price  booms  are  best  explained  by  macroeconomic 
rather  than  market-specific  factors.  I  argue  that  the  rise  in  food 
prices over 2007 and the first half of 2008 should be seen as part of 
the  wider  commodity  boom  which  is  largely  the  result  of  rapid 
economic growth in China and throughout Asia in a context of loose 
money and in which, because of previous low investment, supply 
was  inelastic.  The  demand  for  grains  and  oilseeds  as  biofuel 
feedstocks was the main cause of the price rise but macroeconomic 
and financial factors explain its extent. The futures market may be 
an important monetary transmission mechanism, but it is commodity 
investors, not speculators, who, by investing in commodities as an 
asset class, may have generalized prices rises across markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
The prices of food commodities doubled in real terms from 2005 to mid 2008.
1 Taking figures up 
to the July 2008 peak, the major increases were palm oil (140%), rice (110%), maize (102%), 
wheat  (101%)  and  soybeans  (86%).  These  price  rises  were  general  across  the  range  of 
agricultural products with only a small number of exceptions – sugar prices rose by only 1%. 












































Figure 1: Major agricultural prices, 2000-08
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The rises in food prices took place in the context of a general rise in commodity prices 
led by energy and metals. This is evident from the IMF indices plotted in Figure 2. The figure 
shows the 19% rise in real food prices and the 25% rise in beverage prices to have been modest 
in relation to the much higher rises in energy and metals prices (89% and 125% respectively). 
                                                 
1 I confine myself in this account to discussion of food commodities and do not consider the transmission 
of changes in these prices into retail food prices. 
2  Source: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics. 2008 figures are January-July.   2 
The prices of agricultural raw material prices, which cover natural fibres and natural rubber, fell 
in real terms over the same period.  
 
Figure 2: IMF Commodity price indices, 2000-08
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The entire range of commodity prices saw sharp falls over the second half of  2008, and 
in particular from September in the “post-Lehman” months. Most notably, the price of crude oil 
has  halved  from  over  $140/bl to  under  $60/bl.  Food prices  have  not  been  immune  to  these 
developments. Chicago corn (maize) prices, for example, fell from a June 2008 peak of 700c/bu 
($226/ton at 2006 values) to 400c/bu ($130/ton at 2006 values).  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  I  discuss  why  prices  may  be  more 
responsive to shocks in boom situations than would be the case in normal times. I compare the 
recent (2005-08) boom in agricultural commodity prices with the 1972-74 boom. I suggest that, 
if  we  are  to  understand  commodity  price  booms,  we  need  to  move  beyond  market-specific 
factors and consider macroeconomic and financial factors which operate across large numbers of 
markets. In section 3, I use simple econometric methods to attempt to isolate the main causal 
                                                 















Energy  3 
factors at work. I show that economic growth and changes in the world money supply have 
played an important role in moving agricultural prices. These have been under-played in most 
recent discussions of agricultural prices. There is weaker evidence that the oil price and the level 
of futures market activity have also been important over the more recent period. Exchange rate 
changes have not been important. 
Sections 4 to 7 amplify these arguments. Section 4 looks at biofuel demand. This has had 
a direct impact on maize and oilseed prices. Through incentivizing change is land use, it has had 
indirect effects on wheat and soybean prices, and on meats through use of maize as animal feed. 
Because biofuels still only account for a small proportion of total energy consumption, the long 
run demand for grains and oilseeds for energy purposes becomes infinitely elastic at a price 
dependent on the oil and fertilizer prices. This generates a much closer link between oil prices 
and the prices of agricultural food commodities now than was the case in the past. 
In Section 5, I look at the impact of rapid growth in China and other parts of Asia on 
agricultural prices. Although the direct impact of Chinese growth on food prices is small, I argue 
that the indirect impact is likely to have been large. This indirect impact comes largely through 
increasing  the  sensitivity  of  agricultural  prices  to  demand  shocks  by  decreasing  supply 
responsiveness.  Production  costs  (transport  costs  and  fertilizer  prices),  the  effects  of  higher 
energy prices in stimulating production of biofuels and the effects of higher energy and metals 
prices in stimulating interest in commodity investment are instrumental in this process. 
In  section  6,  I  turn  to  monetary  growth,  a  factor  which  has  received  relatively  little 
attention in the current discussion. The channels through which monetary growth is transmitted 
into  agricultural  prices  are  diverse  and  also  variable  over  time.  Further,  it  is  important  to 
distinguish between unilateral monetary expansion in a particular economy, which will primarily 
affect agricultural prices through exchange rate depreciation, and expansion at the global level, 
which may leave exchange rates unaffected. Interest rate effects on agricultural prices may be 
more pronounced in periods of excess supply rather than in booms. The main effects of monetary 
expansion in the 2006-08 boom may have come through the generalized effects of monetary 
growth on asset prices. 
Agricultural futures markets are one channel through which monetary growth may have 
impacted food commodity prices. I discuss this possibility in Section 7. Contrary to the efficient 
markets view, futures markets can distort prices. Speculation can lead to self-fulfilling bubble-  4 
type  phenomena,  although  the  evidence  is  that  such  events  tend  to  be  short-lived  in  the 
commodity context. Nevertheless, I do find some evidence of likely bubble behaviour in recent 
agricultural price movements. Index-based commodity investments are more problematic. These 
can be large relative to the size of agricultural futures markets which, in any case, are not always 
highly liquid. Although less evidence is available, it does appear that this activity can put upward 
pressure on prices and may transmit price movements from one market to another, both within 
the agricultural sector, and also from energy and metals markets to food commodities. Section 8 
concludes.  
 
2.  Commodity price booms 
The commonality of price rises in energy, metals and foods documented in the introduction, and 
the commonality of their subsequent falls, is unlikely to have been coincidental. It may have 
arisen in either or both of two ways. The first is through common causation – a common set of 
driving factors (dollar depreciation, Asian demand growth etc.) may underlie price rises across a 
range of commodities, foods included. The second mechanism is links across markets – high 
energy prices may raise costs throughout the commodity producing industries, or the belief that 
commodities may be good investments in a stagflationary environment may lead investors to 
take positions across the entire range of commodity markets, again including food commodities.  
Most explanations of recent commodity price movements focus on shifts in the demand 
curve – increased demand for energy and metals in the rapidly growing Asian economies and 
increased biofuels demand for grains and oilseeds. Elementary economic theory tells us that 
rightward shift a demand curve will, in almost all circumstances, lead to a price rise. However, 
the extent of the rise depends on the slope of the supply curve. If supply is very elastic, the price 
rise is modest. If supply is less responsive, the price rise is more substantial. If supply is very 
inelastic, even a small shift in demand can have a large price impact.  
There are two reasons why supply curves may be inelastic in priced booms. First, booms 
tend to come after periods of low investment. Prior to 2005, commodity prices, and agricultural 
commodity prices in particular, had been low for two decades. In energy and metals, the effects 
were seen in low levels of profitability and low share prices, both of which limited the ability of 
firms  to  raise  funds  for  investment.  In  agriculture,  low  levels  of  investment  appear  to  have 
resulted in a slowdown of productivity growth and reduced the capacity of world agriculture to   5 
respond to  current shocks.  The  World  Bank’s  2008  World  Development  Report  called  for  a 
reprioritization  of  agriculture  in  developing  countries  development  strategies  (World  Bank, 
2008a).  
The second factor limiting supply responsiveness is the fact that markets are linked. I 
illustrate this in Figure 3. Consider a demand shock D®D’ which is specific to an individual 
agricultural market. The appropriate supply curve in that market is S.  Factors are drawn in from 
other markets and supply is elastic, with the result that the demand shock leads to the small price 
rise p1- p0.  If, instead, the demand shock is common across a range of agricultural markets, the 
position becomes more complicated. First, there may be cost increases as outputs from one sector 
are used in others, e.g. energy inputs into agricultural production. This is reflected in the upward 
shift of the supply curve to S’. Second, because the possibilities for reallocation of land and other 
inputs across crops are limited in the context of a common demand shock, additional factors are 
only available at considerable extra cost making supply inelastic. The supply curve becomes less 
elastic,  rotating  to  S”.  The  result  is  that  the  same  demand  shock  in  terms  of  the  market  in 
question will lead to the much larger price rise p2 - p0.  
Figure 3: Price responses to idiosyncratic and common demand shocks 
 
This  inter-relationship  across  markets  was  most  evident  in  metals  and  energy  where 
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or longer.  Partly as a result, production costs for new developments increased in line with prices. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that it has also been a feature of agricultural markets. 
Standard “additive” explanations of commodity price movements run in terms of price 
responses to a set of supply and demand shocks. If response coefficients are constant across the 
sample, price responses in the boom to may appear disproportionately large relative to normal 
times. This will tend to strain standard explanations of price changes in terms of market-specific 
factors. Second, and by implication, changes in commodity prices may be better explained by 
aggregative or macroeconomic factors which affect the entire range of commodity markets.  
Many  commentators have noted the parallels with between the 1973-74 and 2005-08 
commodity price booms – see, for example, Radetzki (2006). History should not be expected to 
repeat  itself  precisely  but  the  important  lesson is  that,  as  in  2006-08,  the  1973-74  boom  in 
agricultural prices in 1973-74 occurred against the backdrop of a general rise in commodity 
prices. The causes of the 1973-74 boom were authoritatively discussed by Cooper and Lawrence 
(1975). Then, as more recently, the markets were inter-related.  
Figure 4: Commodity Prices 1970-76 (left, grains; right, coffee and sugar)
4 
 
Figure 4 charts (left panel) monthly real prices for grains over the seven year period 
1970-76,  and  also  (right  panel)  does  the  same  for  coffee  and  sugar.  In  both  cases,  the  real 
petroleum (WTI) price is included, as a broken line, for comparison. 
·  Both took place in the context of enormous world liquidity resulting in part from large 
U.S. trade deficits and loose monetary policies. 
                                                 
4 Source: International Monetary Fund: International Financial Statistics. Petroleum –WTI; grains – US; 



















































































































Sugar  7 
·  In both cases, oil prices jumped sharply upwards. 
·  Both booms ended sharply with the onset of recession, in the second quarter of 1974 and 
third quarter of 2008 respectively.  
·  Metals prices rose strongly in both booms. Coffee and cocoa were sidelined in both cases. 
·  The sugar price, which jumped very sharply in 1973, played an analogous role in 1973-74 
to that of the rice price in 2007-08.
5 
·  Rapid growth in the Japanese economy was a major driving force in the 1973-74 boom, 
as was rapid growth in the Chinese economy in the more recent period. However, Japan 
was probably not as important in the 1970s as China has been in the current decade. 
There were also important differences. Firstly, the 1973-74 boom was shorter than the 2003-08 
commodity price boom. Secondly, although grains participated in the booms, they led in 1973-
74, ahead of the rise in oil prices (see Figure 4), but lagged in 2003-08 where the rise came only 
at the end of the boom. 
There is a tension evident in analysis of both the 1973-74 boom and the 2003-08 boom 
between focus on market-specific factors (poor harvests, biofuels, export restrictions etc.) and 
discussion of global factors (China, world monetary conditions, etc.). Market-specific factors can 
explain why the prices of some products rose and others did not, but macroeconomic factors 
explain the extent of the price rises. When we aggregate across the entire group of agricultural 
food commodities, we will find that it is the macroeconomic and financial factors that account 





                                                 
5 It is a feature of both the rice and sugar markets that the bulk of transactions are at contracted or 
subsidized prices and that only a small proportion of commerce takes place at free market prices which 
therefore tend to be highly volatile. There was no significant shortage of rice in aggregate in 2007-08. The 
jump in rice prices in 2007 resulted from the decision by the Government of India to ban rice exports, 
possibly to hold down domestic food costs in the context of rising wheat prices. The Indian ban limited 
supply to the residual free market and, as prices rose, other exporters followed the Indian example. Rice-
importing countries, most notably the Philippines and Haiti, were forced to pay disproportionately high 
prices. The situation was eventually saved when the Japanese government announced that it would release 
part  of  its  rice  food  security  stockpile  onto  the  world  market.  I  do  not  pursue  this  incident  or  its 
implications further in this paper. For discussion see World Bank (2008b).   8 
3.  Econometric analysis  
In this section, I use simple econometric methods to investigate the possible importance of a 
number of macroeconomic and financial factors which have been held to influence agricultural 
prices.  
·  There is general agreement that changes in the oil price O are likely to feed through into 
other commodity prices. I examine this at greater length in Section 4. 
·  Shocks to aggregate demand feed directly into food commodity prices. Unlike supply 
shocks,  these  tend  to  be  common  across  the  broad  range  of  commodities.  I  discuss 
demand  shocks  at  greater  length  in  section  5.  In  what  follows,  I  measure  aggregate 
demand Y by an estimate of the level of world GDP. Importantly, this measure includes 
GDP  for  China,  India  and  Russia  as  well  as  for  the  advanced  economies.  National 
currencies are converted into U.S. dollars using PPP exchange rates taken from Ahmad 
(2003).  
·  The 1973-74 boom occurred shortly after the 1972 break-down of the Bretton Woods 
fixed  exchange  rate  system.  Subsequently,  there  was  a  substantial  increase  in 
international liquidity which, in the absence of clear nominal anchors, resulted in rapid 
inflation. Commodities were seen as a safe real asset in a period of unreliable monetary 
values (Cooper and Lawrence, 1975). This suggests examination of the impact of changes 
in world money supply M. 
·  Agricultural commodity prices are denominated in terms of the U.S. dollar. Changes in 
the value of the dollar should therefore change dollar prices as documented in Ridler and 
Yandle (1972) and Gilbert (1989). Abbott et al. (2008) emphasize the importance of this 
factor.  I  construct  a  measure  X  of  the  value  of  the  U.S.  dollar  against  a  basket  of 
currencies. 
·  It is possible that activity on agricultural futures markets affect agricultural commodity 
prices. IFPRI (2008) has suggested that commodity speculation may be a contributory 
factor in recent agricultural price rises and has suggested market-calming regulations. We 
explore this hypothesis  in Section 7. Here  I proxy  futures  market  activity by trading 
volume V on the three Chicago grains futures markets.   9 
All monetary variables are deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator. Variable definitions are given in 
an appendix.
 6 
I use Granger non-causality tests to isolate the principal causal factors at work in the two 
booms. The tests use the five ADL (Autoregressive Distributed Lag) equations 
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These choice of lag length reflects prior tests from a more general specification with a uniform 
specification of 9 lags. In each case, the null hypothesis of Granger non-causation is  
  0 1 5 : 0
J J J H b = =b = …   (2) 
and the alternative is its negation. The null and alternative hypotheses are unchanged. Tests are 
reported for the entire sample 1971q3 – 2008q2 and also for the first and second halves of the 




Granger Non-Causality Tests 




































Dependent variable: Change in deflated agricultural foods price index DlnP 
All variables enter are log differences. 
Tail probabilities are given in "[.]" parentheses. 
 
 
First consider the tests over the entire sample. The tests reject Granger non-causality for 
changes in the world money supply and for changes in world GDP, but fail to reject for the oil 
                                                 
6 ADF tests (not reported) confirm that all variables are I(1). I also considered world foreign exchange 
reserves (source: IMF, International Financial Statistics). This gave similar but less powerful results as 
the world money supply variable. In relation to futures activity, I also considered open interest on the 
three grains markets. Results are similar to those reported for futures volume.   10 
price, dollar exchange rate and futures volume (the final result being marginal).  The tests for the 
two sub-samples have less power. Looking at the first half of the sample, which goes to the end 
of 1989, the tests confirm the role of the money supply but also reject non-causality for changes 
in the oil price. By contrast, in the second half of the sample, there single rejection of non-
causality at the 95% level is for GDP growth. Exchange rate changes are not seen as important in 
either sub-sample or in the entire sample. 
  Granger non-causality test rejections are vulnerable to the criticism that the causal link 
may be indirect. Failures to reject are vulnerable to the criticism that some causal links may only 
be apparent if other causal variables are included in the tests equation. These considerations 
motivate  corroboration  of  Granger  non-causality  test  results  using  Vector  AutorRegression 
(VAR) block exogeneity tests, which are the multivariate analogues of bivariate Granger non-
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Table 2 
VAR(3) Block Exogeneity Tests 




































Dependent variable: Change in deflated agricultural foods price index DlnP 
All variables enter are log differences. 
Tail probabilities are given in "[.]" parentheses. 
 
                                                 
7 The choice of a VAR(3) was made after testing down from a VAR(5). A shorter lag length increases 
power.    11 
  The tests for the entire sample confirm the importance of money and GDP growth, as 
anticipated in the Granger non-causality tests in Table 1. No role is seen for other factors. The 
results  from  the  two  sub-samples  suffer  from  lack  of  power  and  do  not  support  any  firm 
conclusions. Overall, these results support the role of world monetary and liquidity factors as a 
driver of agricultural food commodity prices. They do not assign any major role to exchange rate 
changes. The oil price and GDP growth are seen as having a positive impact on agricultural 
prices in the more recent period but not in the nineteen seventies. Futures market activity is not 
seen as having a major impact on prices in either period.  
These results should be interpreted with caution. Failure to establish a causal relationship 
cannot be taken as implying that the variable in question did not influence prices, but rather that, 
if there was such a relationship it was either not consistent over time or that it was insufficiently 
large to be adequately distinguished from the other factors, including random factors, which 
affect these prices. It is clear, for example, from casual observation that exchange rate changes 
do  affect  agricultural  commodity  prices.  However,  exchange  rates  may  not  have  moved 
sufficiently to have been an important determinant of major changes in agricultural prices. In 
section 7 I document evidence of effects of futures market activity on agricultural prices but 
these appear episodic and activity may not be well-captured by trading volume reflects seller-
initiated  as  well  as  buyer-initiated  trades.  However,  where  clear  causal  relationships  are 
encountered, as in the case of monetary and GDP growth, we should take these as evidence that 
these  factors  have  been  responsible  for  a  significant  part  of  aggregate  agricultural  price 
movements over the period in question. 
 
4.  The oil price and biofuels  
Increases in oil prices will result in higher food production costs. One link is through nitrogen-
based fertilizers. A second is through transport costs. However, agriculture is not highly energy-
intensive and although there is a small positive correlation between the levels of real oil prices 
and  real  food  prices,  price  changes  are  poorly  correlated.  Baffes  (2007)  estimates  the  pass-
through of oil prices into agricultural commodity prices as 0.17. Mitchell (2008) estimates that 
the combined effects of higher energy and transport costs have been to raise production costs in 
U.S. agriculture by 15%-20%. Overall, therefore, we may see the agricultural supply curve as 
having only shifted upwards to a small extent as the result of higher oil prices.   12 
More important is that diversion of food crops for biofuels production has raised potential 
demand for food commodities. Mitchell (2008) suggests that biofuels demand is responsible for 
the largest part of the rise in food prices but resists the temptation to quantify this share. Abbot et 
al (2008) concur with this view.  
Production conditions differ from one country to another and so, unsurprisingly, different 
countries have chosen to use different crops as biofuel feedstocks. Maize is the main feedstock 
crop in the U.S., oilseeds hold that position in Europe, Brazil uses sugar cane, Thailand uses 
cassava while palm oil has been most important in the remainder of south Asia. These feedstocks 
also benefit from both mandates and subsidies in the U.S. and E.U. 
Maize  is  principally  used  in  the  developed  world  as  an  animal  feed.  The  figures  in 
Mitchell (2008) show that the global use of maize for feed has risen by 1.5% over the four years 
2004-07 while its use as a biofuel feedstock has gown by 65% over the same period. 70% of the 
increase  in  maize  production  over  this  period  has  gone  into  biofuels.  This  is  a  substantial 
increase  in  demand  and  will  have  had  a  direct  impact on  maize  prices.  Farmers  respond  to 
changes in the relative prices of different grains by changes in land use. The major expansion in 
maize  production  has  been  largely  at  the  expense  of  soybeans  –  see  Mitchell  (2008)  who 
documents  a  23%  increase  in  the  area  devoted  to  maize  in  the  United  States  in  2007 
simultaneously with a 16% decline in soybean area. Although soybeans are not directly used as a 
biofuel feedstock, this shift in land use suggests that biofuel demand for maize was a major 
contributory factor to the rise in soybean prices. 
Price  rises  for  oilseeds,  the  main  European  and  Asian  biofuel  feedstock,  have  been 
substantial. Vegetable oils are widely used for cooking throughout the developing world. As with 
maize, the major impact of biofuel demand for oilseeds has probably been through its effects on 
land use. Mitchell (2008) documents that the eight largest wheat exporting countries expanded 
the area devoted to rapeseed and sunflower by 36% over the period 2001-07 while wheat area in 
the same countries fell by 1%. As with soybeans, it is not economic to use wheat as a biofuel 
feedstock. However, biofuels demand for oilseeds and maize has pre-empted the possibility of 
production increases to meet rising demand. It therefore seems likely that biofuels demand is a 
major contributory factor to the rise in wheat prices. Consistently with this view, the rise in palm 
oil and maize prices, where there has been a direct effect from biofuels demand, has exceeded 
that of soybeans and wheat where the effect is indirect.   13 
Schmidhuber  (2006)  provides  a  framework  in  which  we  can  look  at  biofuels  as  a 
transmission effect from oil the oil market to agricultural food markets. He argues that the prices 
of crude oil and fertilizers define a break-even price for each of sugar cane, maize and palm oil at 
which production of ethanol or biodiesel yields zero profit. At lower prices, it will pay to divert 
production  away  from  food  and  towards  energetic  uses.  In  the  long  run,  demand  for  these 
commodities  in  a  free  trade  world  effectively  becomes  infinitely  elastic  at  these  break-even 
prices. (The infinite elasticity assumption follows from the small likely share of biofuels in total 
energy supplies).  Subsidies and tariffs, such as the U.S. tariff on imported ethanol, complicate 
these relationships but the principles remain clear. The consequence is that the grains and oilseed 
markets become integrated into the energy market and shocks to energy prices are transmitted to 
food commodities. This is what we have seen in 2006-08. Furthermore, since refining biofuel 
capacity is relatively inexpensive, price transmission from the oil market to food markets can be 
rapid. 
 
Figure 5: Biofuels demand and grains prices 
  
None of this implies that use of food commodities for biofuels inevitability implies food 
commodity prices as high as those seen over the 2006-08 boom. On the other hand, it is also true 
that prices are likely to remain higher than those seen prior to 2006. In Figure 5, the demand for 
grains for food uses is D and the supply curve is S. In the absence of biofuels demand, the grains 
price  is  p0.  Demand  for  grains  as  a  biofuel  feedstock  is  infinitely  elastic  at  price  p1  which 






S’   14 
fails to materialize and there is no price impact. If the price of oil is higher, of fertilizer prices are 
lower, such that 1 0 p p > , the grains price rises and biofuels demand squeezes out some food 
demand. It follows that biofuels demand can raise but cannot reduce food commodity prices. As 
oil and fertilizer prices vary, on average the effect will be positive. Under the infinite demand 
elasticity assumption, increased grains supply (the shift from S to S’ in Figure 5) will not change 
this  situation  but  will  lead  to  increased  consumption  of  grains  as  biofuels  without  further 
reduction in grains consumption in foods. This appears to be what has happened in Brazil where 
increases in sugar cane production have permitted increases in the production of both refined 
sugar and ethanol. 
This discussion suggests that, although the direct impact of a rise in the oil price on 
agricultural prices will likely exceed the direct pass-through into production costs. Because the 
rise in costs is common across all agricultural commodities, there is little scope for reallocating 
land and other inputs across crops and so supply elasticities will be low. Further, the rise in oil 
price results in a new highly elastic demand component which puts an oil-price related floor 
under  grains  prices.  Biofuels  demand  pulls  agricultural  production  costs  up  until  marginal 
production  cost  become  equal to  the  exogenously  given  oil  price  parity  level.  Market-based 
analysts  may  be  tempted  to  attribute  higher  agricultural  prices  to  high  production  costs,  for 
example higher fertilizer prices, but, if the infinite elasticity assumption is valid, the causation is 
in fact in the opposite direction, from the grain price to production costs.  
 
5.  Economic growth 
Rapid economic growth in Asia and, in particular, China, has been one of the major determining 
factors  in  the  world  economy  during  the  first  decade  of  this  century.  So  long  as  a  country 
remains small relative to the world economy, fast growth has little implication for the remainder 
of the world. However, once that country becomes responsible for a significant share of world 
economic activity, its fast growth implies a notable addition to world economic growth. China is 
now in that position. The consequence has been that China has vacuumed in those products and 
raw materials which it does not itself produce. 
The consensus is that Chinese growth was indeed a major factor behind escalation of 
metals and  energy prices. There is less agreement that Asia can be held responsible for the 
general rise in agricultural prices. Energy and metals are products with high income elasticities   15 
of  demand.  Among  the  metals,  aluminium,  copper  and  steel  have  high  usage  intensity  in 
construction. Food products have low demand elasticities and do not benefit from construction 
booms. Rapid Chinese growth has had little direct effect so far, with the exception of soybeans, 
on  the  demand  for  imported  agricultural  products  –  see  Mitchell  (2008).  Asian  growth  is 
therefore not a major direct driver of food price increases in terms of shifting the food demand 
curve. I argue that, nevertheless, growth should be seen as one of the major factors behind the 
extent of the recent food price boom.  
The first route by which Chinese growth specifically, and Asian growth generally, may 
have impacted food prices is through the direct effect of energy price increases on transport and 
other  costs,  already  discussed  in  section  4.  More  important  are  the  effects  of  Asian  growth 
through fertilizer prices and freight rates, both of which rose sharply over 2007-08. Phosphate 
and potassium-based fertilizers are mined products and the rise in their prices has resulted from 
the general supply problems faced by the mining industry in attempting to rapidly expand across 
the  entire  range  of  mined  products  simultaneously.  The  rapidity  of  the  demand  expansion 
together with a lack of investment over the nineteen eighties and nineties has resulted in inelastic 
supply. Nitrogen-based fertilizers, which derive from oil, may be supplied more elastically but, 
as noted, the rise in oil prices led to an upward shift in their supply curve. The two factors 
together generated across-the-board rises in fertilizer prices. This is the shift from S to S’ in 
Figure 3. 
Freight rates have been driven by China’s appetite for iron ore imports which has grown 
faster  than  inelastically  supplied  dry  carrier  and  port  infrastructure  capacity  (Konstantinos, 
2008). Oil prices play  a subsidiary  role.  Like the rise in transport costs arising  from higher 
energy prices, the rise in fertilizer prices increases agricultural production costs.  
  Freight rates are passed through into agricultural prices by increasing the wedge between 
producer and consumer prices in traded products. They limit the transmission of high prices to 
food exporters who therefore have a diminished incentive to expand production. They increase 
prices to food importers. Markets become less effectively integrated. The rise in fertilizer prices 
is amplified for fertilizer-importing countries. Both the rise in fertilizer prices and that in freight 
rates reduce the incentives for producers to respond to price increases.  
These cost increases have had some impact on agricultural prices by shifting the supply 
curve upwards. The more important effect, however, comes through rotation of the supply curve   16 
(S’  to  S”  in  Figure  3)  with  the  result  that  supply  has  become  less  elastic.  Where  food 
commodities have experienced demand shocks, such as grains and oilseeds, the result has been 
high price increases than might otherwise have been expected. For those products, such as coffee 
and  cocoa,  which  have  not  experience  a  demand  shock,  the  rotation  of  the  supply  curve  is 
irrelevant. 
 
6.  Monetary growth 
Monetary explanations of changes in price levels and relative prices attracted wide support in the 
nineteen seventies and eighties. Bordo (1980) and Chambers and Just (1982), who considered the 
impact of monetary growth on agricultural prices, found that monetary expansion could raise 
agricultural prices relative to a more general price deflator. By contrast, Awokuse (2005), who 
used VAR methods on more recent data, concluded that monetary factors had relatively little 
impact  on  agricultural  prices.  Instead,  he  saw  changes  in  these  prices  which  as  determined 
primarily  by  changes  in  input  prices  and  by  exchange  rate  movements.  The  Granger  non-
causality results reported above in section 3 are in line with those of Bordo (1980) and Chambers 
and Just (1982) but go against Awokuse’s conclusions. 
  A  resolution  of  this  divergence  may  be  found  by  consideration  of  the  monetary 
transmission mechanism. Noting the unreliability of the commonly used monetary aggregates, 
Taylor (1995) stresses the role of the prices of financial assets in the transmission process. In 
particular, exchange rate changes play a central role in this process. An implication is that we 
should expect different results from a unilateral monetary expansion in a single country, say the 
United States, than from a general expansion across the entire world. In the former case, the 
impact of monetary expansion will be felt primarily through dollar depreciation while in the 
latter case, exchange rates may not change markedly and transmission will be through other 
channels. Considering the effects of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. agricultural prices, Awokuse 
(2005) indeed found that exchange rates were the primary determinant of price changes.  The 
results reported in this paper look instead on the effects of changes in world money supply on 
world prices and attribute causal impact to monetary factors.  
  A perennial difficulty with monetary explanations of macroeconomic phenomena is that 
transmission channels can vary over time and that, depending on the channel, transmission can 
be more or less rapid. Friedman (1960) famously noted the importance of “long and variable   17 
lags” in the exercise of monetary policy. See also  Friedman (1961). This variability hinders 
structural modelling of monetary phenomena and can result in scepticism in relation to monetary 
explanations even when non-structural tests, such as the Granger non-causality  tests used in 
section 3 of this paper, suggest that monetary growth is important. 
  A  second  transmission  channel,  real  interest  rates,  emphasized  by  Taylor  (1995) 
illustrates  these  problems.  Resource  depletion  arguments  suggest  that  we  should  expect  a 
relationship between the real prices of oil and metals and real interest rates. In agriculture, one 
might make a similar argument via land prices. There is little empirical support for this view. 
Geman (2005, p.120) states that it is reasonable assumption that commodity prices and interest 
rates are uncorrelated. See Heal and Barrow (1980) for opposite view. In the short term, the main 
route by which changes in interest rates will affect agricultural prices is through changing the 
expected return expected from holding inventory. If we regard titles to commodity inventories as 
financial assets, we should expect interest sensitivity to be measured by the likely duration of the 
holding, which will be longer in periods of excess supply than periods of excess demand. This 
suggests that interest rate changes should perhaps be more important in explaining low than high 
prices.  
  The 2006-08 boom in agricultural prices took place contemporaneously not only with 
booms in other commodity prices but also with booms in equity and real estate prices. This 
suggests that, in an environment in which central banks were controlling goods prices, monetary 
growth may have spilt over into asset prices. Svensson (1985) sets out a cash-in-advance model 
which has this implication. Agricultural futures markets provide a possible route through which 
this transmission may have taken place. I explore this channel in the following section.  
 
7.  Futures markets 
Futures markets play a central role in many of the most important agricultural markets – wheat, 
maize,  soybeans  and  sugar.  These  markets  facilitate  the  transfer  of  risk  from  so-called 
“commercial” traders, generally referred to as hedgers, who are exposed to movements in the 
commodity price through their regular commercial activities, to “non-commercial” traders, often 
referred  to  as  speculators.  Stockholders,  such  as  grain  elevator  companies,  are  typical 
commercials. They operate on a small margin between their sale and purchase prices with the 
consequence that a small price decline can eliminate the profits on their inventories. By selling   18 
grain futures contracts, they can offset this price exposure. The speculators, who in aggregate 
take short futures positions, do so in the hope or expectation that the futures price will appreciate 
yielding a capital gain. 
  The second important function of futures markets is that of price discovery. Markets 
allow agents who believe they have information to trade on the basis of that information. Finance 
theory distinguishes between informed and uninformed speculation – see O’Hara (1995). This 
information may arise from knowledge of the markets or from research. Informed speculation is 
expected to have an impact on the market price. If speculative trades are both informed and 
sufficiently large, or if sufficiently many traders share the same information, the price will move 
accordingly  and  the  information  becomes  impounded  in  the  market  price  which  is  more 
informative as a consequence. 
Efficient markets theorists argue that commodity price rises have been driven completely 
by market supply and demand fundamentals and that futures markets form the mechanism by 
which  information  about  fundamentals  becomes  incorporated  in  market  prices.  The  crucial 
evidence they cite is the fact that the prices of those commodities which are not traded on futures 
exchanges have risen as much, or more, than those that have markets. Examples are coal in the 
energy sector, steel and minor metals in the metals such as molybdenum in the metals sector and 
rice  among  the  agriculturals.  This  argument  is  not  entirely  persuasive  –  Chinese  demand  is 
sufficient to account for the rise in those metals and energy prices which lack futures, and rice is 
a special case.
8 
  Standard theory implies that the price of any particular futures price should follow a 
random walk process with the price “innovations” representing new information impounded into 
the market (Samuelson, 1973).
9 Most speculators do not have information or, at most, mislead 
themselves into believing they have information. Many are trend followers who attempt to infer 
the price implications of informed speculation from price movements. These speculators do not 
add to the information in the market. Finance theory predicts that uninformed speculation should 
either not have any effects on price, or in less liquid markets, should not have persistent effects. 
                                                 
8 See footnote 5. 
9 This assertion relies on futures prices being unbiased predictors of future cash prices. We should expect 
this to be true if the risk associated with the cash price process were completely diversifiable which may 
be a reasonable approximation for agricultural prices. Even if the proposition is not precisely correct, 
biases appear to be small. Prices for so-called “continuous futures”, formed by splining the prices form 
successive front contracts, will not exhibit the random walk property and may mean revert.   19 
According  to  standard  theory,  if  uninformed  trades  move  a  market  price  away  from  its 
fundamental value, informed traders, who know the fundamental value, will take advantage of 
the profitable trading opportunity with the result that the price will return to its fundamental 
value. The informed speculators stabilize prices as set out by Friedman (1953). Despite this, 
economists and policy-makers worry that trend-following can result in herd behaviour.  
U.S. legislation defines a “commodity pool” as an investment vehicle which takes long or 
short futures positions. A “Commodity Pool Operator” (CPO) is an investment institution which 
operates  a  commodity  pool.  “Commodity  Trading  Advisors”  (CTAs)  advise  on  and  manage 
futures  accounts  in  CPOs  on  behalf  of  investors.  The  vast  majority  of  Commodity  Trade 
Advisors (CTAs) operate by identifying trends and investing accordingly There is therefore a 
concern that a chance upward movement in a price may be taken as indicative of a positive trend 
resulting in further buying and hence driving the price further upwards, despite an absence of any 
fundamental  justification.  De  Long  et  al  (1990)  show  that  informed  traders  may  bet  on 
continuation of the trend rather than a return to fundamentals. The conditions under which the 
informed traders will act in this way is that they have short time horizons (perhaps as the result 
of  performance  targets  or  reporting  requirements)  and  that  there  are  sufficiently  many 
uninformed trend-spotting speculators. These conditions may often be satisfied. When they are 
satisfied, speculative bubbles may occur. Negative bubbles are also possible.  
The existence and extent of trend-following behaviour may in principle be ascertained by 
regressing  CTA-CPO  positions  on  price  changes  over  the  previous  days.  Using  confidential 
CFTC data, Irwin and Holt (2004) find that the net trading volume of large hedge funds and 
CTAs in six of the twelve futures markets they consider is significantly and positively related to 
price movements over the previous five days. However, the degree of explanation is low. Irwin 
and Yoshimaru (1999) report very similar results for CTA-CPO positions.  
Phillips (2006) has suggested an alternative and simpler test for extrapolative behaviour 
which, however, does not allow us to attribute the resulting bubbles to any specific group of 
market agents. Consider a simple autoregression of today’s futures price ft on yesterday’s price 
  1 ln ln t t t f f - = a+b +e   (4)   
If the (log) futures price follows a random walk process, we have b = 1, consistently with the 
futures price  being  an  unbiased predictor  of  future  spot  prices.  Extrapolative  behaviour  will 
imply an explosive autoregression with b > 1. It is sometimes held that explosive processes are   20 
implausible since  otherwise  prices  would  tend  to  zero  or infinity,  but  this  is  not true  if  the 
coefficient b is only slightly in excess of unity, implying that autoregression  is mildly explosive 
and if the explosive behaviour does not last for a long time.  
 
Table 3 
Tests for Explosive Behaviour: Grains Futures Prices  
 January 2006 – August 2008 
    Contract  ˆ b  t  Price change 
Dec 07  1.022  0.467
*  4.0%  March 2006 
( n = 21)  Corn  Jul 08  1.004  0.021
*  3.3% 
Dec 08   1.0349  0.407
*  8.0%  December 2006 
( n = 18)  Corn 
Jul 09  1.055  0.881
**  10.0% 
Jul 07  1.079  0.854
**  - 15.8% 
Sep 07  1.067  0.676
*  - 11.6% 
Dec 07  1.024  0.234
*  - 11.6% 
June 2007 
( n = 19)  Corn 
Mar 08  1.019  0.173
*  - 9.6% 
Jul 08  1.088  0.789
**  13.3% 
Sep 08  1.110  0.927
**  14.0%  September 2007  
(n=17)  Wheat 
Dec 08  1.097  0.762
*  14.5% 
May 08  1.042  0.452
*  11.3% 
Jul 08  1.097  0.954
**  11.0% 
Sep 08  1.075  0.644
*  9.3% 
Dec 08  1.106  0.996
**  10.5% 
Mar 09  1.112  1.027
**  10.6% 
Jul 09  1.133  1.425
**  7.1% 
November 2007 
( n = 20)  Wheat 
Dec 09  1.106  1.008
**  7.2% 
Mar 08  1.023  0.381
*  17.8% 
May 08  1.018  0.293
*  17.6%  February 2008 
( n = 19)  Soybeans 
Jul 08  1.017  0.291
*  19.3% 
The table reports the autoregressive coefficient b from regression of the log of the daily 
price on the previous day’s price over the calendar month in question for the CBOT corn, 
wheat and soybeans contracts. The t statistic, in parentheses, tests the null hypothesis 
0 : 1 H b =  against the explosive alternative 1 : 1 H b > . This statistic has the Dickey-Fuller 
distribution but unlike the standard case, we are interested in the right tail. Based on 
100,000 simulations, critical values for n = 17, 18, 19 and 21 observations are 0.041, 
0.031, 0.025, 0.020 and 0.012 (95%) and 0.776, 0.760, 0.747, 0.734 and 0.731 (99%). 
These simulations were performed under the null hypothesis that b = 1. A single asterisk 
indicates a statistic which rejects H0 at the 95% level and a double asterisk one which 
rejects also at the 99% level. Statistics are reported only for metals and months where at 
least  one  estimated  coefficient  b  is  significantly  greater  than  unity.  The  percentage 
change in prices is the price on the final day of the month relative to that on the final day 
of the previous month for the same contract. 
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Table 4 
Tests for Explosive Behaviour: Soybean Oil 
 January 2006 – August 2008 
  Contract  ˆ b  t  Price 
change  Contract  ˆ b  t  Price 
change 
May 06  1.069  1.010
**  12.1%  Jul 06  1.044  0.631
*  10.5% 
Aug 06  1.038  0.554
*  9.9%  Sep 06  1.043  0.613
*  9.8% 
Oct 06  1.046  0.672
*  10.0%  Dec 06  1.037  0.540
*  9.7% 
Jan 07  1.035  0.512
*  9.6%  Mar 07  1.031  0.476
*  9.3% 
April 2006 
(n = 17) 
May 07  1.012  0.244
*  9.3%  Jul 07  1.027  0.416
*  10.1% 
Aug 07  1.000  0.000  5.8%  Sep 07  1.002  0.020
*  6.0% 
Oct 07  1.010  0.116
*  6.1%  Dec 07  1.003  0.034
*  5.9%  March 2007 
(n = 20) 
Jan 08  1.014  0.159
*  6.0%  Mar 08  1.019  0.216
*  6.5% 
May 08  1.036  0.347
*  7.5%  Jul 08  1.023  0.247
*  7.0% 
Aug 08  1.036  0.408
*  7.2%  Sep 08  1.032  0.362
*  7.0% 
Oct 08  1.010  0.103
*  6.6%  Dec 08  1.008  0.096
*  6.1% 
October 
2007 
( n = 21) 
Jan 09  1.012  0.130
*  7.4%         
Jan 08  1.004  0.036
*  6.0%  Mar 08  1.017  0.171
*  6.3% 
May 08  1.030  0.353
*  6.3%  Jul 08  1.025  0.273
*  6.0% 
Aug 08  1.022  0.255
*  6.3%  Sep 08  1.032  0.382
*  7.1% 
Dec 08  1.021  0.235
*  7.7%  Jan 09  1.013  0.160
*  7.3% 
December 
2007 
( n = 18) 
Mar 09  1.016  0.212
*  7.3%  May 09  1.011  0.140
*  7.4% 
Mar 08  1.062  1.552
**  26.9%  May 08  1.057  1.452
**  26.6% 
Jul 08  1.053  1.373
**  26.5%  Aug 08  1.032  1.320
**  26.7% 
Sep 08  1.050  1.249
**  26.7%  Oct 08  1.044  1.136
**  27.1% 
Dec 08  1.043  1.102
**  26.8%  Jan 09  1.044  1.139
**  26.8% 
Mar 09  1.048  1.257
**  26.9%  May 09  1.044  1.189
**  26.5% 
Jul 09  1.042  1.151
**  26.5%  Aug 09  1.039  1.011
**  26.2% 
Sep 09  1.037  0.945
**  25.8%  Oct 09  1.021  0.433
*  26.2% 
February 
2008 
(n = 18) 
Dec 09  1.022  0.438
*  24.7%         
Sep 09  1.019  0.271
*  -26.4%  Oct 09  1.027  0.393
*  -27.6%  March 2008 
(n = 18)  Dec 09  1.019  0.271
*  - 27.1%         
The table reports the autoregressive coefficient b from regression of the log of the daily price on the 
previous day’s price over the calendar month in question for the CBOT soybean oil contracts. The t 
statistic, in parentheses, tests the null hypothesis  0 : 1 H b =  against the alternative 1 : 1 H b > . This 
statistic has the Dickey-Fuller distribution but unlike the standard case, we are interested in the 
right tail. Based on 100,000 simulations, critical values for n = 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 observations 
are 0.041, 0.031, 0.025, 0.020 and 0.012 (95%) and 0.776, 0.760, 0.747, 0.734 and 0.731 (99%). 
These simulations were performed under the null hypothesis that b = 1. A single asterisk indicates a 
statistic which rejects H0 at the 95% level and a double asterisk one which rejects also at the 99% 
level. Statistics are reported only for metals and months where at least one estimated coefficient b 
is significantly greater than unity. The percentage change in prices is the price on the final day of 
the month relative to that on the final day of the previous month for the same contract.   22 
 
Gilbert  (2009)  uses  this  procedure  to  test  for  extrapolative  behaviour  in  non-ferrous 
metals  prices  over  the  period  2003-08.  He  reports  weakly  explosive  behaviour  in  a  greater 
number of months than would arise by chance if futures prices followed a random walk. Here I 
repeat the same test for Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) grains prices over 2006-08. Results are 
reported in Table 3.  I find evidence of  extrapolative behaviour in six out of the 32 months 
examined. This is more than we should to arise by chance. Three of the instances are in corn 
futures, two in wheat and one in soybeans.
10  
I have also performed the same exercise on the CBOT soybean oil market. This is more 
complicated because the market trades eight contracts per year, instead of five in corn and wheat 
and seven in soybeans. Results are reported in Table 4. Evidence of extrapolative behaviour is 
found in seven of the 36 months considered. Again, this is higher than would arise by chance if 
futures prices followed random walk processes. 
None of this implies that the high food commodity prices over the recent boom were 
speculative or should be seen as bubbles, or that any bubbles that did occur were necessarily 
persistent. What they do suggest is that there was some speculative froth, and that this may have 
contributed to the high prices seen in the markets. Evidence for this may be seen from a plot of 
the soybean oil price – see Figure 6 where periods in which expectations have been identified as 
extrapolative are graphed with a heavy line. The chart strongly suggests a speculative bubble in 
February-March 2008, a time at which industry commentators remarked that prices were out of 
line with fundamentals.
11 However, this bubble was short-lived and the figure does not suggest 
bubbles in other periods in which prices appear to have been generated extrapolatively.  
Speculation is only half of the futures story. The traditional discussion of commodity 
futures  activity  has  been  in  terms  of  hedgers  and  speculators.  However,  a  new  class  of 
transactors  in  commodity  futures  markets  has  become  important  over  the  past  two  decades. 
These are investors who regard commodity futures as an “asset class”, comparable to equities, 
bonds, real estate and emerging market assets, and who take positions on commodities as a group 
                                                 
10 An alternative would be to take each commodity-moth pair as a separate observation, the proportion six 
out of a total of 96 such pairs is in line with a 5% Type I error. 
11 For example, in an article dated 18 March 2008 entitled “Focus on soybean oil”, Poultyrsite.com wrote, 
“… the extreme prices reached in recent weeks exceed levels that might have occurred historically under 
similar fundamental conditions”. The article concluded “Soybean oil prices appear to remain overvalued 
…”. http://www.thepoultysite.com/poultrynews/14395/weekly-outlook-focus-on-soybean-oil     23 
based on the risk-return properties of portfolios containing commodity futures relative to those 
confined to traditional asset classes. Masters (2008) testified before a U.S. Senate committee that 
the behaviour of this group of transactors is quite different from that of traditional speculators, 
and it is therefore possible that this will result in different effects on market prices.  Gilbert 
(2009) discusses the differences between futures speculators and futures investors and attempts 

























Figure 6: Chicago Board of Trade soybean oil price, January 2006-August 2008
12 
 
Commodity  investors  do  not  generally  invest  directly  in  commodity  futures,  Instead, 
banks  and  other  financial  institutions  facilitate  such  investments  by  providing  suitable 
instruments, typically Exchange Trade Funds (ETFs), commodity certificates or swaps. In the 
case of certificates and swaps, they offset much of their net position by taking opposite positions 
on the futures markets.  The majority of such institutions will aim set to replicate a particular 
                                                 
12 First position, rolled on first day of the month. Source: Chicago Board of Trade   24 
commodity futures index in the same way that equity tracking funds aim to replicate the returns 
on an equities index. Such institutions are referred to as Index Funds.  
The most widely followed commodity futures indices are the S&P GSCI and the DJ-AIG 
Index.  The S&P GSCI is weighted in relation to world production of the commodity averaged 
over the previous five years.
13 These are quantity weights and hence imply that the higher the 
price of the commodity future, the greater its share in the S&P GSCI. Current and recent high 
energy prices imply a very large energy weighting – 71% in September 2008. The DJ-AIG Index 
weights the different commodities primarily in terms of the liquidity of the futures contracts (i.e. 
futures volume and open interest), but in addition considers production. Averaging is again over 
five years. Importantly, the DJ-AIG Index also aims for diversification and limits the share of 
any one commodity group to one third of the total.  The September 2008 energy share falls just 
short of this limit.
14 September 2008 weightings of these two indices are charted in Figure 7. 













Figure  7:  Commodity  Composition,  S&P  GSCI  (left)  and  DJ-AIG  Commodity  Indices, 
September 2008 
 
The behaviour of commodity investors differs from that of speculators in three important 
respects: 
                                                 
13 http://www2.goldmansachs.com/gsci/#passive  “Softs” are tropical agricultural commodities or which 
the most important are cocoa, coffee and sugar. 
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a)  Investors take position  across the entire range of commodity futures, not in specific 
futures  
b)  Investors are almost always long only while speculators may equally be long or short. 
c)  Investors hold their commodity positions for long periods of time – months or years – 
rolling positions forward from expiring to more distant months, while speculators hold 
positions for short periods of time – days or weeks – and very seldom roll. 
According to many commentators, these positions are sufficiently large that index-based 
inventors have come to dominate the commodity futures markets relegating fundamental factors 
to a minor, supporting, role. Commodity index providers had invested a total of $43bn in U.S. 
agricultural futures at the end of 2007, rising to $58bn by the end of June 2008 (CFTC, 2008). 
This is shown in Table 5 which also gives the shares of the index funds’ net positions in total 
open interest. These are generally in the 25%-35% range, although higher for wheat, live cattle 
and lean hogs. They average 27%. In June 2008 testimony before a U.S. Senate committee, 
Soros (2008) asserted that investment in instruments linked to commodity indices had become 
the “elephant in the room” and argued that investment in commodity futures might exaggerate 
price rises.  
 
Table 5 
Index Fund Values and Shares  
U.S. Agricultural Markets 
  31 Dec 2007  30 June 2008 
  $bn  Share  $bn  Share 
Corn  7.6  25.8%  13.1  27.4% 
Soybeans  8.7  26.1%  10.9  20.8% 
Soybean oil  2.1  24.8%  2.6  21.7% 
Wheat  9.3  38.2%  9.7  41.9% 
Cocoa  0.4  11.3%  0.8  14.1% 
Coffee  2.2  26.0%  3.1  25.6% 
Cotton  2.6  33.0%  2.9  21.5% 
Sugar  3.2  29.0%  4.9  31.1% 
Feeder cattle  0.4  23.2%  0.6  30.7% 
Live cattle  4.5  48.4%  6.5  41.8% 
Lean hogs  2.1  43.6%  3.2  40.6% 
Total  43.1  26.9%  58.3  27.1% 
Source: CFTC (2008) valued at front position closing prices. 
The wheat figures aggregate positions on the Chicago Board of 
Trade  and the Kansas  City Board of Trade. Total shares  are 
price-weighted.   26 
 
This argument may have force than is often allowed. First, investments are in the entire 
commodity  class,  they  may  be  largely  independent  of  current  or  expected  future  price 
movements in specific markets. Secondly, whereas speculators, who rapidly move in and out of 
markets, provide the liquidity which allows hedgers to obtain counterparties, investors tend to 
absorb market liquidity, effectively obliging the speculative community to do more work – see 
Masters (2008).  One might paraphrase his view as stating that, in effect, the funds have become 
the fundamentals. 
If these views are correct, we might expect to see commodity price effects from index-
based investment, particularly in the less liquid agricultural markets. These effects might include 
upward pressure on prices, increased price volatility (as the result of reduced market liquidity) 
and  higher  correlations  across  markets.  Because  index-based  investment  is  still  a  relatively 
recent development, empirical evidence remains sparse. We may investigate these links using 
Granger non-causality analysis, as in section 3. Using information if the CFTC’s Commitments 
of Traders supplementary reports, which distinguish positions held by index-providers for twelve 
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where rt is the week-on-week change in the price of the nearby contract, xt is the weekly  change 
in futures positions of index providers and zt is the weekly  change in futures positions of other 
non-commercial traders. The equation was estimated by OLS over the sample of weekly data 
from 31 January 2007 to 26 August 2008 for the four CBOT agricultural futures: corn, soybeans, 
soybean oil and wheat. In each case, I test six null hypotheses 
i)  Index positions do not Granger-cause returns: 
1
0 1 2 3 : 0 H b =b =b = ; 
ii)  Non-commercial positions do not Granger-cause returns: 
2
0 1 2 3 : 0 H g = g = g = ; 
iii)  Neither  index  positions  nor  non-commercial  position  Granger-cause  returns: 
3
0 1 2 3 1 2 3 : 0 H b =b =b = g = g = g = ; 
iv)  Index  and  non-commercial  positions  have  identical  effects  on  returns: 
( )
4
0 : 0,..,3 j j H j b = g = ;   27 
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Hypothesis 
4




0 H  and 
3
0 H  is rejected, hypothesis 
5
0 H  is 
interesting only if 
1
0 H  is rejected and hypothesis 
6
0 H  is interesting only if 
2
0 H  is rejected.  
Test results are given in Table 6. The tests fail to establish a causal link from either index 
or non-commercial positions to returns for corn, soybean oil or wheat. By contrast, for soybeans, 
the  hypothesis 
1
0 H   that  index  positions  do  not  Granger-cause  soybean  returns  is  rejected. 
Furthermore, the effect, which is estimated as positive, is seen as persistent (
5
0 H  is also rejected). 
The data narrowly fail to reject the Masters (2008) hypothesis,
4
0 H , that index and speculative 
positions have different effects at the 95% level. These results provide some statistical support 
for the view that commodity investment contributed to the boom in agricultural food prices. 
 
Table 6 
Granger Non-causality Tests 
 
1
0 H  
2
0 H  
3
0 H  
4
0 H  
5
0 H  
6
0 H  
  3,125 F   3,125 F   6,125 F   3,125 F   1,125 F   1,125 F  
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r r x z - - -
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= a + a + b + g +e ∑ ∑ ∑ , where rt is the week-on-week change 
in the price of the nearby contract on the Chicago Board of Trade, xt is the weekly  change in 
futures positions of index providers and zt is the weekly  change in futures positions of other 
non-commercial traders. The equation was estimated by OLS over the sample 31 January 2007, 
weekly,  to  26  August  2008.  The  null  hypotheses  are 
1 2 3
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The two polar positions on the effects of futures market activity on agricultural prices 
both appear too simple. On the one hand, the efficient markets view that transactions which do 
not convey information can have no price impact is contradicted by both market experience and 
econometric  evidence.  On  the  other  hand,  purely  speculative  episodes,  in  which  price 
movements become self-reinforcing, tend to be of short duration. Although discussion tends to 
focus on speculation, it is investment flows that may have resulted in the most marked effects on 
food prices. The size of these flows can be large relative to overall market capitalization and 
liquidity. Since commodity investors tend to look at the likely returns to commodities as a class, 
and not at likely returns on specific markets, their activities may tend to transmit upward (or 
downward) movements in one market across the entire range of commodity futures markets. This 
is  likely  to  have  resulted  in  upward  pressure  in  the  less  liquid  agricultural  markets  and  to 
increased price correlation across markets. It may also have transmitted upward price movements 
in energy and metals markets into the agricultural commodities. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Discussions of the causes of commodity prices tend to adopt an additive framework in which the 
total impact is the sum of price responses to a set of demand and supply shocks in the underlying 
markets. This approach may not be helpful in analyzing major booms, such as those of 1972-74 
and 2005-08, in which a large number of prices rise together. These additive explanations require 
too much coincidence and the resulting price responses to shocks may seem disproportionate.  
In this paper, I have stressed two factors which can explain the failures of the market-
based  approach.  Firstly,  when  demand  shocks  simultaneously  impact  a  number  of  markets, 
supply elasticities will tend to be lower than when shocks are market-specific. Secondly, the 
supply elasticities themselves may depend on macroeconomic and financial factors. The first 
consideration implies that the behaviour of markets in boom episodes is likely to be different 
from behaviour under normal conditions. The second implies a likely multiplicative interaction 
of macroeconomic and financial factors with market shocks which will undermine the additive 
analysis.  Aggregation  across  a  range  of  markets  may  imply  that  these  macroeconomic  and 
financial factors are seen as the main determinants of changes in overall prices. In line with this   29 
view,  Granger  non-causality  tests  show  world  GDP  growth  and  monetary  expansion  as 
determinants of changes in world agricultural prices.  
In summary terms, the major demand shock experienced by the agricultural sector over 
the  recent  boom  arose  from  the  demand  for  grains  and  oilseeds  as  biofuel  feedstocks. 
Commodities, such as coffee and cocoa, which did not experience this shock, either directly or 
indirectly through land reallocation, did not see major price rises.  The extent of the price rises in 
grains and oilseeds was a consequence of growth in China and other Asian economies together 
with relaxed monetary policy over the preceding years. The resulting boom in metals and energy 
prices both raised production costs and the responsiveness of agricultural supply. 
Agricultural futures markets participated in the general rise in asset prices and this may 
have been an important monetary transmission channel. There is some evidence for speculative 
bubbles in agricultural food commodity prices although these probably persist only for short 
periods of time. However, the major focus should be on commodity investors, not on speculators. 
The general rice in energy and metals prices stimulated interest in commodity futures as an asset 
class. This activity is sufficiently large that it has the potential to move prices. By investing 
across the entire range of commodity futures, index-based investors may have generalized price 
increases  across  markets  and  increased  price  correlations  across  markets,  both  within  the 
agricultural sector and between agriculture and other sectors.  
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Data are quarterly over the sample 1969q1-2008q2. 
 
M  World money supply. Money supply of China (M2), the Euro zone (M2), India (money 
and quasi-money), Japan (M2), Russia (money and quasi-money), Switzerland (money 
and  quasi-money),  the  U.K  India  (money  and  quasi-money).  and  the  U.SA.  (M2) 
converted into US dollars at the average exchange rate of the month and deflated by the 
UD  GDP  deflator  (2000=100).  Pre-1999  Euro  zone  figures  are  calculated  from  the 
statistics for France, Germany and Italy scaled up to the 1999q1 Eurozone aggregate. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
O  Oil price: WTI, New York, $/bl, deflated by the UD GDP deflator (2000=100). Source: 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
P  Index  of  agricultural  food  commodity  prices  (2000=100),  deflated  by  the  UD  GDP 
deflator (2000=100). Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
V  Futures market volume (contracts of 5,000 bushels). Open interest in the Chicago Board 
of Trade corn, soybeans and wheat contracts, summed over all contracts and averaged 
over the quarter. Source: Chicago Board of Trade. 
 
X  U.S. dollar exchange rate relative to basket comprising the euro (Deutschmark prior to 
1999), yen, Australian dollar and Canadian dollar with weights 2:2:1:1. All exchange 
rates are deflated by the relativity between the country’s GDP deflator and the U.S. GDP 
deflator in line with Gilbert (1989). The German GDP deflator is used to deflate the euro 
exchange rate. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
 
Y  World GDP at constant 1993 prices. National currencies are converted to U.S. dollars 
using  the  PPP  exchange  rates  in  Ahmad  (2003).  GDP  is  aggregated  over  Australia, 
Canada, China (mainland, from 1978), France, Germany, India (from 1988), Italy (from 
1980), Russia (from 1995), Spain (from 1970), Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.A. 
Annual figures for China and  India (to 1996) are interpolated onto a quarterly basis. 
Because data is absent for many countries at the start of the sample, GDP levels are 
extrapolated  backwards  iteratively  using  the  world  GDP  estimate  such  that,  in  any 
particular quarter, the estimated GDP growth rate depends only on data for countries for 
which there are published data. Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
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